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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
1 AS I ON CI I S. : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20100264-CA 
vs. 
ERRI LEE TATTON, 
Defendant/ Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICT ION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
I • ••• . iviction for Disorder!. Conduct, a class C misdemeanor 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102. lhis Court ha jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2010). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
. Did the district court err by failing to instruct the jury on the proper definition 
of vehicular traffic? 
Claims.. > ^rroneom , . > • • . , - :• > • • - • , wed for 
correctness. State v.JelK . -l! StclTenson \. Smith's Management Corp.. 682 P.2d 
1342, n4ft(' -oii LTJJ). 
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2. Was the defendant's conviction for making 'unreasonable noise' improper 
because it effectively criminalized protected speech? 
Whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Norris, 2007 UT 6, f 10. 
3. Did the district court err by failing to instruct the jury that the defendant had 
a right to protect her property? 
Claims of erroneous jury instructions present questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49; Steffenson v. Smith's Management Corp., 682 P.2d 
1342,1346 (Utah 1993). 
4. Did the district court err by failing to instruct the jury that the intent to cause 
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm must have been the defendant's 
predominant intent? 
Claims of erroneous jury instructions present questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49; Steffenson v. Smith's Management Corp., 682 P.2d 
1342, 1346 (Utah 1993). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-102: Disorderly conduct. 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: (a) he refuses to comply with the lawful 
order of the police to move from a pulic place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or 
physically offensive condition, by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or (b) 
intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 
thereof, he: 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior; 
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard in a public 
place; or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-61-102(62): 
"Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, and other 
conveyances either singly or together while using any highway for the purpose of travel. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sherri Lee Tatton was charged by Information with one count of Disorderly Conduct 
and one count of Criminal Trespass. (R. 9.) The City later amended the Disorderly Conduct 
count to allege violations of two specific subsections of the statute, namely the subsections 
prohibiting unreasonable noise and the obstruction of vehicular or pedestrian traffic, 
respectively. (R. 16.) The case proceeded to jury trial, where the City's principal witnesses 
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testified that the defendant yelled at Haley Bruce inside and outside of Salt City Pizza, a 
restaurant adjacent to the private parking lot owned by the defendant. The defendant 
repeatedly told Ms. Bruce, the patron inside Salt City Pizza who had parked her vehicle in 
the defendant's private parking lot, that she needed to move the car. 
Bruce quickly left Salt City Pizza, and she walked to her car. Instead of backing out 
of the parking lot as the defendant requested, Bruce attempted to drive forward through the 
defendant's private parking lot. Tatton refused to let Bruce pull forward, instead demanding 
that Bruce back out of the parking lot through the same place she entered. Bruce called the 
police, who responded to the scene and issued the parties citations. Bruce was cited with 
trespassing, and Tatton was cited with Disorderly Conduct and Criminal Trespass for her 
putative entrance inside Salt City Pizza. At trial, the defendant asked for a number of jury 
instructions, most of which were denied. Among the instructions requested were instructions 
informing the jury that Tatton had a right to protect her property, that obstruction of vehicular 
traffic required more than the obstruction of a single vehicle, and that the defendant's 
predominant intent had to have been to cause annoyance, inconvenience or alarm in order to 
be found guilty of Disorderly Conduct. Ultimately, the jury found the defendant guilty of 
Disorderly Conduct and not guilty of Criminal Trespass. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 22, 2009 Haley Bruce drove her car into the parking lot of Costume Castle 
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in Layton, Utah. (R. 87 at 52.) Ms. Bruce parked in the first stall of the parking lot, which 
was owned by the defendant, Sherri Tatton, and her husband. (Id. at 23, 93.) Despite 
numerous signs indicating that the parking lot was reserved for patrons of Costume Castle,1 
Bruce nonetheless left her vehicle in the parking lot and walked to Salt City Pizza, which was 
adjacent to the parking lot. Upon seeing Bruce leave her car in the private parking lot, the 
defendant went over to Salt City Pizza to tell Bruce that she needed to move her car. (Id. at 
97.) 
According to Randall Hunt, an employee of Salt City Pizza, the defendant soon 
entered the store and began yelling at Bruce to move her car. (Id. at 38.) Hunt testified that 
Tatton was in the store for roughly 45-50 seconds. (Id. at 45.) Bruce, however, testified that 
Tatton was in the store for only a few seconds, and that Tatton was yelling at her to move the 
car. (Id. at 62-63.) Bruce further testified that she left the store to move her car almost 
immediately after Tatton's request. (Id.) 
Bruce returned to her vehicle, and she backed out a short distance from the parking 
stall, which was closest to the east entrance of the parking lot. (Id. at 54.) She then attempted 
to drive her car forward so that she could drive through the parking lot and exit the west 
entrance. (Id. at 101.) Tatton stepped in front of the vehicle, refusing to let Bruce drive 
through the private parking lot to the other exit. (Id.) Tatton indicated that Bruce needed to 
back out of the parking lot the same way she entered, rather than driving through her private 
1
 As noted above, there were numerous signs indicating that the parking lot was reserved 
for patrons of Costume Castle. Indeed, there were such signs on the east side of the lot 
where Bruce parked, in the middle of the lot on a utility pole, and another sign placed just 
outside the entrance to Salt City Pizza. 
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property. (Id.) Unwilling to back out of the parking lot, Bruce drove forward, striking 
Tatton. (Id.) After Tatton refused to move out of her way, Bruce called the police for 
assistance. (Id. at 56.) At trial, Bruce acknowledged that she could have left the parking lot 
by backing out onto the street. (Id. at 63.) 
One Layton City officer, Wesley McKinney, testified a trial that he responded to the 
scene shortly after dispatch received Brace's phone call. (Id. at 12.) Upon his arrival, he 
heard Tatton talking about people parking in her private lot. (Id. at 22.) Officer McKinney 
also observed the no trespassing signs throughout the parking lot, and he further testified that 
a driver would have been able to leave the parking lot by backing onto the street. (Id. at 24-
29,33.) 
Based on the incident described above, Layton City charged Tatton with Disorderly 
Conduct, in violation of U.C.A. § 76-9-102, and Criminal Trespass, in violation of U.C.A. 
§ 76-6-206(2)(a). (R. 9.) Before trial, Layton City amended the information filed in the case, 
and it proceeded to trial on two specific subsections of the Disorderly Conduct statute. (R. 
16.) The two pertinent subsections required the City to demonstrate that the defendant, 
intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk 
thereof, made unreasonable noises in a public place or obstructed vehicular or pedestrian 
traffic. See U.C.A. §§ 76-9-102(b)(ii) & (iv). 
Before the trial, the defendant argued that the Disorderly Conduct statute was both 
vague and overbroad. (R. 87 at 5-8.) The defendant proffered in evidence demonstrating 
that the City could not meet its burden of showing that Tatton obstructed vehicular or 
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pedestrian traffic. (Id. at 9-10.) The trial judge reserved ruling on the matter, noting that the 
defendant could renew that motion at the close of the City's case. (IcL at 11.) At the close 
of the City's case, the defendant moved the court for directed verdict on the subsection of the 
disorderly conduct statute alleging that the defendant obstructed vehicular or pedestrian 
traffic, again arguing that the definition of "traffic" required more than a potential 
obstruction of the movement of one vehicle. (Id. at 68.) The court denied the defendant's 
motion, noting that it was 'not going to deny the State's ability to use that as one of the 
elements of the offence." (Id. at 71.) The defendant also asked the court to instruct the jury 
on the definition of vehicular traffic, specifically requesting that "the language from the 
Connecticut decision that [counsel] cited earlier -just for the record, 363 Atlantic 2d 772 -
be incorporated into that instruction." (Id. at 79.) The court denied the requested instruction, 
noting that 'vehicular traffic is undefined in the State of Utah and that if it needs to be 
defined, that some Court other than myself will define it." (Id. at 79-80.) 
In addition to the motion for directed verdict and the jury instruction regarding 
'vehicular traffic,' the defendant also requested an additional instruction regarding the 
defendant's right to defend her property. (Id. at 77,83-84.) More specifically, the defendant 
argued that she 'should be entitled in this case to a jury instruction about defense of 
property." (Id. at 77.) The defendant proposed that the court instruct the jury that "it's a 
complete defense to the charges if you determine that [the defendant's] actions were 
necessary to prevent or terminate custodial interference2 with real property." (Id.) The court 
2
 The court recognized that counsel misspoke in referring to "custodial interference," 
noting that defense counsel was "saying custodial interference, but what you mean is 
criminal interference." (Id. at 78.) 
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denied the defendant's motion, despite acknowledging that "[cjertainly an individual in this 
state is allowed the right to use force to defend property against unreasonable interference 
with that property." (Id. at 78.) 
Similarly, the defendant requested an instruction that recognized the need for the City 
to demonstrate that the defendant's predominant intent was to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm. (Id. at 83-84.) The requested instruction was based on a decision from 
the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795 (1994), and the 
defendant specifically asked the court to implement the holding oflndrisano and instruct the 
jury that "in order to convict the defendant of disorderly conduct, you must determine that 
the predominant intent of the defendant was or is to cause annoyance, inconvenience or 
alarm, rather than to exercise her constitutional rights." (Id.) In arguing for the requested 
instruction, counsel noted that it was "a proper instruction to give so that somebody's not 
unduly convicted based on the fact that they engaged in conduct that may or may not have 
been intended to safeguard their constitutional rights. In this case, a protection of private 
property." (Id. at 85.) The court ultimately denied the defendant's request, noting that it "was 
not going to allow Connecticut to make law in Utah." (Id.) 
The jury ultimately convicted the defendant of Disorderly Conduct, a class C 
misdemeanor, and acquitted the defendant of Criminal Trespass. The court imposed a 
sentence of 90 days in jail and a $500.00 fine, though it suspended imposition of the jail term 
and $300.00 of the fine. The court also imposed a term of twelve months court probation 
with the condition that the defendant complete an anger management class. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The district court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury at trial. More 
specifically, the judge erred in failing to instruct the jury about the definition of 'vehicular 
traffic,' and further erred by failing to grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
when it was apparent that there was only one vehicle that could have conceivably been 
obstructed. In addition, the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury that the 
defendant was entitled to defend her personal property and that the jury also needed to 
find that the defendant's predominant intent was to cause annoyance, inconvenience or 
alarm in order to convict her of Disorderly Conduct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
I. The District Court Erred By Failing to Instruct the Jury on the Proper 
Statutory Meaning of Traffic' And By Failing to Grant Tatton's Motion for a 
Directed Verdict. 
The second relevant prong of Utah's disorderly conduct statute prohibits the 
defendant from obstructing vehicular or pedestrian traffic. See U.C.A. § 76-9-102(b)(iv). 
Courts interpreting similar statutory language in other states have held that 'traffic' 
necessarily encompasses more than the interference with one vehicle. See State v. 
Anonymous. 363 A.2d 772 (Conn.Com.Pl. 1976); Seymour v. Seymour. 289 N.Y.S.2d 
515 (N.Y.Fam.Ct. 1968). In addition, while the disorderly conduct statute does not 
specifically define traffic, the Utah Traffic Code provides that "[t]raffic means 
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pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, and other conveyances either singly or 
together while using any highway for the purpose of travel." U.C.A. § 41 -6a-102(62) 
(emphasis added). 
In State v. Anonymous, supra, the defendants were charged with disorderly 
conduct for 'obstruction of vehicular traffic' when one of them stood by the side of the 
complainant's car, preventing him from exiting. The court held that such behavior did 
not constitute a "violation of [the subsection regarding the obstruction of vehicular 
traffic] by any fair construction of the statute. 363 A.d at 775. The definition of 'traffic,' 
reasoned the court, "refers to the flow of pedestrians or vehicles along a street or 
highway; it does not apply to a single individual...." Id. 
Similarly, the case in Seymour, supra, involved a situation in which a husband was 
charged under an analogous subsection when he attempted to force his wife's car off the 
road with his own vehicle. Despite the indisputably aggressive nature of the allegation, 
the New York court dismissed the charge, holding that "the type of conduct which the 
subsection proscribes relates to the blocking of highways or thoroughfares for extended 
periods of time to the public's inconvenience." 289 N.Y.S.2d at 518.3 
At trial, the defendant first requested a directed verdict at the close of the City's 
case, arguing that "vehicular or pedestrian traffic has to require more than obstructing one 
vehicle, if even one vehicle is obstructed in this case." (R. 87 at 68.) The defendant cited 
3
 Significantly, the penal statute at issue in Seymour was virtually identical to the Utah 
statute at issue here. As the court noted, the relevant statute in Seymour provided: 'A 
person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof:... 5. He obstructs vehicular or 
pedestrian traffic[.]' 
10 
to the Connecticut decision detailed above, but the district court denied the defendant's 
motion. Later, the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury on the proper definition 
of 'vehicular traffic,' again citing the Connecticut decision. (R. 87 at 79.) The court 
denied the requested instruction, noting that: 
The code is - the Utah code is absolutely unhelpful in determining what 
constitutes vehicular traffic. And while you [defense counsel] have cited case 
law out of other jurisdictions that would describe vehicular traffic as 
something other than what has been described ... I'm going to deny your 
motion and state that vehicular traffic is undefined in the State of Utah and 
that if it needs to be defined, that some Court other than myself will define it. 
(R. 87 at 79-80.) 
The decisions in Anonymous and Seymour make clear that there must be more 
than the mere obstruction of one vehicle's movement in order to obstruct vehicular traffic. 
Such a requirement is also consistent with the fact that the disorderly conduct requires an 
intent to cause public inconvenience. Further, had the Utah legislature intended for the 
obstruction of one car or one pedestrian to constitute a violation, it clearly could have said 
so. Indeed, it would not have been difficult for the Utah legislature to simply proscribe 
the obstruction of a 'vehicle or pedestrian.' In addition, while the term 'vehicular traffic' 
is undefined in the disorderly conduct statute, this Court may look to the definition of 
'traffic' provided by U.C.A. § 41-6a-102(62), which clearly requires that a vehicle or 
pedestrian use a "highway for the purpose for the purpose of travel" in order to constitute 
"traffic." 
At trial, it was clear that Bruce parked her vehicle on private property owned by 
Tatton. Her egress was obstructed only to the extent that Tatton would not permit her to 
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leave the private property through another exit, instead instructing her that she should 
back out of the parking lot the same way that she came in. There was no evidence 
presented that any other vehicles or pedestrians were obstructed whatsoever. Further, 
there was no evidence presented that satisfied the definition of 'traffic' set forth in U.C.A. 
§ 41-6a-102(62). As such, conviction under that prong of the disorderly conduct statute 
was in error. Because "no special verdict form was employed at trial" and the "jury was 
not required to indicate the basis for its finding," State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49 at j^ 38, it is 
entirely possible that the jury convicted under the prong prohibiting the obstruction of 
vehicular traffic, which would require reversal of the defendant's conviction. Id. 
POINT II. 
II. Conviction Under the Unreasonable Noise Subsection Was Erroneous as the 
Statute Cannot Be Read to Criminalize Speech. 
In Logan City v.Huber. 786 P.2d 1372 (UT App 1990), the Court of Appeals struck 
down a municipal disorderly conduct ordinance proscribing 'obscene' or 'abusive5 language 
when spoken with the same intent described in the state disorderly conduct statute. In that 
case, the defendant was charged with disorderly conduct for shouting vulgarities to police 
officers when they tried to obtain his vehicle registration. Id. at 1373. The Court invalidated 
that subsection of the ordinance as unconstitutionally overbroad on its face, holding that the 
provision "criminalizes speech." Id. at 1374. Significantly, it held that the "constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of speech do not permit the government to punish the use of words 
or language outside of'narrowly limited classes of speech.'" Id. (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 
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405 U.S. 518,521-22(1972)). The Court also stated that the ordinance was unconstitutional 
because it applied to "all harsh insulting words that recklessly create a risk of inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm," and that it punished a "significant amount of protected verbal 
expression, including criticism and challenge, vulgarities and remonstrations, whether [...] 
directed at a police officer, ordinary citizen, or one who is not even present." Id. at 1376. 
In this case, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute before trial, 
arguing that the statute was impermissibly overbroad and vauge. (R. 87 at 5-9.) At trial, the 
words that were characterized as 'unreasonable noise' were 'vulgarities and remonstrations' 
directed at Bruce, an 'ordinary citizen.' While potentially insulting and annoying, the 
government sought to criminalize Tatton's speech simply because it could lead the court and 
jury to believe that vulgarities and remonstrations constitute 'unreasonable noise.' Indeed, 
the government's final arguments to the jury are telling. In discussing what constitutes 
'unreasonable noise,' the City queried the jury. It asked the following questions: "Is it 
reasonable to go into a public store where there may be patrons and where there are 
employees and do what the defendant did? [...] Is it reasonable that the employee, Mr. 
Randall, had to be subjected to that?" (R. 87 at 130.) It is also telling that the government 
never raised the issue of the volume of the noise or the nature of the sound during its cross-
examination of the defendant, instead relying almost exclusively on the expletives, harsh 
language, and vulgarities that the defendant allegedly used. (R. 87 at 106-11.) 
The City simply couched its arguments regarding abusive and obscene language in the 
'unreasonable noise' subsection of the statute, which has already been held unconstitutional 
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by the Utah Court of Appeals. While it is undoubtedly clear that vulgarities and 
remonstrations may be annoying and bothersome to some people, it is equally clear that they 
constitute protected speech. Conviction on this theory of the case was therefore erroneous. 
Furthermore, there is at least a reasonable likelihood that the jury based its verdict on this 
erroneous theory, which requires the conviction to be reversed, Jeffs, 2010 UT at ^ 38. 
POINT III. 
III. The District Court Erred By Failing to Instruct the Jury That the Defendant Had 
a Right to Protect Her Private Property. 
It is well recognized that an individual may protect her property rights.4 Indeed, Utah 
law has explicitly adopted a defense for the protection of one's property. Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-2-406 provides: 
A person is justified in using force, other than deadly force, against another 
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real property or personal 
property: 
(1) lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) lawfully in the possession of a member of his immediate family; or 
(3) belonging to a person whose property he has a legal duty to protect. 
As evident above, the pertinent statute provides a defense for an individual trying to 
prevent criminal interference with her property. 
While the statute specifically refers to "force," a logical reading of the statute would 
4
 The comments made by the trial judge in this case clearly demonstrate the court's 
awareness of a right to protect one's own property. As the trial judge observed, 
"[c]ertainly an individual in this state is allowed the right to use force to defend property 
against unreasonable interference with that property." (R. 87 at 78.) 
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imply that a person's verbal attempts to prevent criminal interference with her property 
should also be protected under the statute. Logically, if the legislature intended for the use 
of force to be justified in defending one's property, it should follow that other, non-forceful 
means of protecting one's property should constitute a defense as well. It would surely be 
an incongruous result to suggest that an individual could use physical force to protect her 
property, but could not be verbally aggressive in doing so. 
In this case, the defendant specifically asked the court for an instruction recognizing 
her right to protect her property. (R. 87 at 77.) Such a request was based on the fact that the 
defendant was the owner of the parking lot as well as the fact that Bruce had trespassed on 
the property by parking her car in an area reserved for patrons of Costume Castle.5 The court 
denied the defendant's requested instruction, reasoning that "my sense is that kind of 
interference usually applies to personalty rather than realty when somebody's attempting to 
leave the property." (Id. at 78.) 
Had the jury been properly instructed, however, it could have easily considered the 
defendant's actions in preventing Bruce from driving forward through the defendant's 
personal property as a lawful exercise of the right to prevent criminal interference with her 
personal property. In addition, a jury could have easily considered the words spoken by 
Tatton-regardless of whether they were loud or vulgar-as a lawful means of protecting her 
property. It is difficult to surmise how Tatton may have been justified in the use of physical 
force against Bruce yet unable to verbally confront a trespasser or require that the trespasser 
exit her property the way she entered instead of continuing to drive through the property. By 
5
 Bruce in fact received a citation for trespassing. (R. 87 at 58.) 
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failing to instruct on Tatton5 s right to protect her property, the trial court deprived Tatton of 
her ability to meaningfully defend herself against the charges. 
POINT IV. 
IV. The District Court Erred By Failing to Instruct the Jury that the Intent to Cause 
Public Inconvenience, Annoyance, or Alarm Must be the Defendant's 
Predominant Intent. 
Statutes similar to Utah's disorderly conduct statute have been frequently challenged 
as impermissibly vague. See, e^,, Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); State 
v. Indrisano, 228 Conn. 795 (1994). In order to preserve the constitutionality of those 
respective state statutes, some courts have imposed an additional requirement in interpreting 
the limitations placed on conduct that is done 'with intent to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof.' In order to ensure that the statute 
did not infringe upon an individual's constitutional rights, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
in Colten interpreted the disorderly conduct statute as follows: 
As reasonably construed, the statute does not prohibit the lawful exercise of any 
constitutional right. We think that the plain meaning of the statute, in requiring 
that the proscribed conduct be done 'with intent to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof,' is that the specified 
intent must be the predominant intent. Predominance can be determined either 
(1) from the fact that no bona fide intent to exercise a constitutional right 
appears to have existed or (2) from the fact that the interest to be advanced by 
the particular exercise of a constitutional right is insignificant in comparison 
with the inconvenience, annoyance or alarm caused by the exercise. 
Colten v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1971) (emphasis in original; 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
16 
The Connecticut Supreme Court recognized that the "United States Supreme Court 
approved the Kentucky gloss on the statute," Indrisano, 228 Conn, at 807, and adopted the 
requirements imposed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Specifically, the court in Indrisano 
held that "in order to support a conviction for disorderly conduct, the defendant's 
predominant intent must be to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, rather than to 
exercise his constitutional rights." Id. at 809. 
In this case, the defendant requested that the court instruct the jury that the defendant's 
predominant intent must have been to cause inconvenience, annoyance or alarm rather than 
the exercise of her protected rights, namely the right to protect her property. Clearly, there 
was ample evidence to suggest that the defendant was motivated by the desire to protect her 
property. The trial was replete with testimony indicating that Tatton wanted Bruce to move 
her vehicle off the defendant's property. See, e.g., (R. 87 at 20.) (Officer McKinney noting 
that Tatton "was pacing back and forth and raising her voice, yelling about people trespassing 
on her property"); (R. 87 at 41-43.) (describing measures taken by defendant to ward off 
trespassers, including ropes and posted signs); (R.87 at 53.) (Bruce testifying that Tatton 
opened restaurant door and began telling Bruce she "needed to get [her] car off [Tatton's] 
property."). Clearly, the jury could have easily found that the defendant's predominant intent 
was to protect her property rather than cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. 
Instead, by depriving Tatton of her ability to contend that she was merely exercising a 
protected right, the trial court unjustifiably infringed on the defendant's lawful exercise of 
a constitutional right. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the conviction of Ms. Tatton must be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on the $ _ day of October, 2010. 
M. DELICINO 
for Sherri Lee Tatton 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
on this day of October, 2010, to: 
Bruce Ward 
Layton City Attorney 
437 North Wasatch Dr. 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Secretary 
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SHERRI LEE TATTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
No addendum needed for this case. 
